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Abstract 
Many studies have focused on why deliberative institutions should be established in order to 
develop Chinese people’s citizenry skills; however few focus on the social conditions and 
public sentiments that shape the development of deliberative mechanisms. Skills and 
awareness of citizenry is not only brought into being by deliberative institutions that are set 
up by the government, but evolve through interplays between technologies and social changes.  
 
As a test-bed for economic reform Guangdong is increasingly identified by translocality and 
hybrid culture. This is framed by identity conflict and unrests, much of which is due to 
soaring wealth polarisation, high volumes of population movement, cultural collisions and 
ongoing linguistic contestations. These unrests show the region’s transformation goes beyond 
the economic front. Profound changes are occurring at what anthropologists and philosophers 
call the changing social conciseness or moral landscape (Ci, 1994; Yan, 2010). The changing 
social moralities are a reflection of the awareness of individuals’ rights and responsibilities, 
and their interdependencies from dominant ideologies.   
 
This paper discusses Guangdong’s social and cultural characteristics, and questions how 
existing social conditions allow the staging of political deliberation by facilitating political 
engagement and the formation of public opinion. The paper will investigate the tragedy of 
Xiao Yueyue in Foshan, Guangdong, where ‘right’ and ‘responsibility’, ‘self’ and ‘other’ 
define the public sentiments of deliberation and participation.   
 
Introduction 
A rich body of scholarship exists concerning Guangdong’s economic reform over the past 
three decades. Vogel (1989) described Guangdong as ‘one step ahead in China’ in terms of 
economic development. But after more than three decades of reform, Guangdong has lost 
many of its comparative advantages and is no longer ‘one step’ ahead; many coastal cities and 
inland regions are bypassing Guangdong in different regards. However, some recent 
developments indicate Guangdong is probably ‘ahead’ once again; this time Guangdong is 
China’s test bed for social and political reforms.  
 Some recent examples include Guangdong becoming the first administrative region in 
China to release its annual budgetary reports, establishing a collective bargaining union 
system to represent migrant workers in 2010, and probably most inspiring among all, is the 
Wukan incident. After mass protests took place in Wukan village in Guangdong over land 
dispute between the local villagers and the county government in September 2011, the 
incident captured global publicity in both mainstream media and cyberspace. In the face of 
mounting pressure, the Guangdong government sacked the corrupt local official and 
recognised the (self-organised) democratically-elected village committee of Wukan residents 
as Wukan’s legitimate village authority hereafter (The Age, 2012).  
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A more formal step was taken by the Central Government in mid-2012, which 
designated Guangdong as ‘the site of pilot reforms designed to streamline the country's 
administrative examination and approval system’ (Cheng, 2012). A Xinhua news article 
explicitly stated: ‘the province's (Guangdong) performance under current conditions 
(administrative reform) will act as a weathervane for the entire country's future development’ 
(ibid). It further argued: ‘the significance of the administrative approval reforms cannot be 
underestimated, as they form a crucial part of China's political reforms’ (ibid.). It seems like 
the transformation of Guangdong being ‘one step ahead’ in economic reforms to political 
reforms (zheng gai) is not merely an academic concept,1 but these recent developments 
indicate the practical dynamics of moving towards a deliberative framework in Guangdong.  
This essay is part of my PhD thesis, titles: ‘A Guangdong model: The Internet and 
political deliberation in Guangdong, China’, which aims to assess the development of new 
information and communication technologies (ICTs) in driving the process and mechanism of 
political deliberation in Guangdong. The aim of my thesis, however, does not intend to 
conceptualise either the Internet or the deliberative democratic framework as ‘alternative 
public sphere’ as many authors have done; instead, I intend to seek the social and cultural 
resources of deliberative politics in Guangdong as the departure point. These resources 
emerged and evolved through the interactions between different communication agents 
(society, market and the state), changing technologies, and greater social cultural 
transformations over the years. 
Therefore, instead of asking how deliberative institutions help to develop Chinese 
people’s citizenry skills, this essay examines how skills and awareness of citizenry have 
evolved throughout changing social and economic, cultural and technological conditions. The 
Internet thus will not be the central concern here, but it will be discussed as part of 
Guangdong’s overall social and economic developments. In doing so, the analyses also depart 
from the current scholarships on Internet political deliberation, which often see the Internet as 
the (potential) ‘site’ for deliberation rather than investigating what people do in relation to the 
Internet. Four aspects merit consideration: first, Guangdong as the test bed for China’s 
economic reform; second, Guangdong’s geographical, ethnic and cultural intimacies with 
Hong Kong; third, the hybrid and translocal culture and demographic shifts in Guangdong; 
and four, the conflicting relationship between classes and over cultural identities in 
Guangdong. These four aspects are intertwined with each other and each deserves thorough 
investigation. 
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The essay will address these four aspects by proceeding in the following way. The first 
section provides a brief overview of Guangdong by focusing on Guangdong’s economic 
reform and its proximity with Hong Kong. The discussion here aims to highlight the social 
and cultural resources for political deliberation that have emerged from these two aspects. The 
second section discusses the theoretical implications of deliberative democracy in Guangdong 
by arguing that the deliberative approach provides a powerful analytical framework to 
understand social complexities and dynamics in Guangdong. At the same time, Guangdong’s 
unique cultural and demographic structures, with the rapid advancement of the Internet 
technologies also broaden the scope of political deliberation. Political deliberation does not 
merely proceed in a vertical flow (state-public), but issues such as wealth polarisation, social 
inequalities, and increasing translocal and hybrid demographic shifts in Guangdong indicate a 
horizontal approach (public-public) in both the theoretical enhancement and practical 
application of political deliberation.  
In extending this argument, the third section provides a case study to illustrate how 
political deliberation is not merely a state-led, top down political mechanism, but a self-
orientated, public-public social dynamic that lead to political deliberation among the members 
of the Guangdong public in seeking mutual respects.  
 
Guangdong – a brief overview 
This section consists of two parts: economic reform and Guangdong’s proximity to Hong 
Kong. The first part provides a brief overview of Guangdong’s economic reform, but instead 
of focusing on the changing economic management, leadership and policies on administrative 
systems, as others have noted (Vogel, 1989; Cheung 1998; 2002; Chung, 2008), it highlights 
changes people’s perception and social norms in respect to being the first to reform in China. 
The second part discusses Guangdong’s close ethnic and cultural linkage with Hong Kong. 
By learning about the lives and experience of friends and relatives’ who migrated to Hong 
Kong, and by consuming Hong Kong’s popular culture, the disjuncture between Guangdong 
and the advanced mediascape of Hong Kong (Ma, 2012) is reduced; this linking with Hong 
Kong impacts on social and political values.   
Guangdong locates on China’s southern coast, bordering with Fujian, Jiangxi, Hainan 
and Guangxi provinces and Hong Kong and Macau SARs (special administrative regions). 
Guangzhou is the provincial capital, and its  mainstream dialect is Cantonese (with Chaozhou 
and Hakka as the other two major dialects). Its 3368.1km coastal line is the longest in China, 
this geographical feature provides Guangdong ‘excellent access to aquatic resources and 
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maritime transport’ (Cheung, 2002, p.125), which helps to establish Guangdong’s role of 
being China’s major port throughout the history. By 1 November 2010, Guangdong has 104.3 
million residents, which tops the nation (Guangdong Government, 2011), and it is also the 
most populous province in China, about one-third of its population are ‘floating’ (liudong 
renkou) (Xinhua, 2005).  The high mobility is largely due to the influx of migrant workers 
across China for its economic development in the Pearl River Delta region, as well as the 
frequent travels by ‘millions of overseas Cantonese’ (Cheung, 2002, p.124). According to 
Guangdong Government’s official record (2012), the 20 million overseas Cantonese 
constitute two third of the world’s overseas Chinese (with foreign citizenship) population. As 
the first province to launch China’s economic reform in the late 1970s and early 1980s, 
Guangdong has three of China’s four special economic zones (SEZs): Shenzhen, Zhuhai and 
Shantou (and Xiamen in Fujian). Its CNY ¥5.3 trillion (about USD $838 billion) aggregated 
nominal GDP in 2011 accounts for nearly 12% of China’s national GDPs (CNY ¥47.16 
trillion) (Xinhua, 2012). 
Historically, Guangdong has been the site for popular resistance and political upheavals 
(Cartier, 2008, p.2).  Major upheavals in recent history include the two Opium Wars (1839 
and1856), the Taipin Rebellions (1850-1864) against the ruling Qing Dynasty, the Chinese 
Revolution (Xinhai Revolution) in 1911 led by Sun Yat-sen overthrown the Qing Dynasty 
and ended China’s imperial rule, and Guangdong has been a major site for the Communist 
Revolution (1926-1949) led by Mao Zedong. 
 In terms of new ICTs consumption, Guangdong’s 63 million Internet users rank highest 
in China and the 60.4% Internet penetration rate is also the highest among provinces (Beijing 
and Shanghai have the highest Internet penetration rates, 70.3% and 66.2%% respectively) 
(CNNIC, 2012). In terms of ICTs production and manufacture, Zhuhai focuses on high-tech 
manufactory of electrical and computer products. It is known as China’s ‘Silicon Valley’. 
Shenzhen, on the other hand, is home for China’s shanzhai (copycat) culture, where 
International brands such as iPhone and Android phones are imitated and locally (re)produced 
to offer cheap and low-end ICTs devices to the local and working classes consumers (Qiu, 
2009; Wallis and Qiu, 2012).  
 Besides the advancement and diffusion of new ICTs, Guangdong is home of the ‘most 
respected journalistic institutions’ in China – the Nanfang Daily Media Group (Dean, 2009), 
which become reputable after defying media censorship during the Severe acute respiratory 
syndrome (SARS) and the Sun Zhigang incident in 2003 (Zhao, 2008; Zhao and Xing, 2012).2 
By using Baidu Index over the past few years, my own observation also note Guangdong has 
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been the most active region in responding to Internet-related events in China. These events 
often relate to resistance and protests against official corruptions, power abuse, and social and 
legal injustices.  
These developments do not warrant Guangdong as the right place for political 
deliberation, but they do highlight the social openness and outward looking attitudes in 
Guangdong; and the economic reform has reinforced just that.  
 
The first to reform 
Given the space here, I will not go through China’s economic reforms in details, instead, I 
would like to highlight some general and major social changes alongside the economic reform. 
To understand the social impacts of the economic reform in Guangdong, the national 
institutional restructuring and local economic characteristics must be considered together. 
Being a major economic province in China, the impacts and effects of the macro, nationwide 
institutional reform are easily observable; yet its geographical and historical uniqueness also 
rejects a universal, nation-wide alike social transformation, but with local specifics.  
China’s economic reform can be summarised by terms like privatisation and 
decentralisation. The transition from a centrally planned economy which use to allocate jobs, 
housing, providing schooling and health care services to its people, to a market-driven, 
individuals orientated and self-responsible system, radically change the perception of life and 
social moralities in China. Although the government still have its hand firmly on key 
industries (such as military and resources sectors), commercial sectors (including the media) 
were disembarked from the government’s direct control and management. Privatisation and 
commercialisation have the connotation that run against the traditional socialist collective and 
sharing values, but the sense of competitions and individual interests/well being, become 
centric. For example, the common social criticism of the post-80s generation (who were born 
as the only child in a family under the One Child Policy) being selfish, self-centric, and 
arrogant (Liu, 2009; Qiu, 2009; Yan, 2010), and the older generation’s concern that these new 
generation will not survive the increasingly competitive employment market and society 
(because they were being spoiled) (Cockain, 2012), resemble precisely the changing social 
realities on the one hand, and the changing social moralities and values on the other (Yan, 
2010; Ci, 1994). These changes, however, are not passive, rather, they prompts active search 
and exploration of individualities. Lisa Rofel’s (2007) account on ‘desiring China’ provides a 
comprehensive overview of the mechanisms of people’s desires for identification, sexual and 
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emotional freedom, and the desire to be recognised, indicates strong and vibrant social 
sentiments that are shaped by what Yan (2010) calls, ‘individualisation in China’.  
As a province of China, Guangdong was no exception. The key word here, however, is 
not ‘economic’ or ‘reform’, rather, it is being the first, ahead in China, making Guangdong an 
interesting case.  It is important to note the different modes of economic activities in 
Guangdong. Besides decentralisation and privatisation, Guangdong’s economic was largely 
driven by ‘foreigners’ (including Hong Kong, Macau and overseas Chinese business people) 
(Vogel, 1989; Cheung, 1998, 2002). As Vogel (1989, pp.200-203) documents, Guangzhou 
still held the Export Commodities Fair throughout the Cultural Revolution. While the Export 
Fair was mainly open up to overseas Chinese at the time, it gradually opened to wider western 
business communities during the 1970s.  By attracting direct foreign investment, 
Guangdong’s economic develop involved radical transformation from an agricultural based 
economy to a manufacturing and trading (Cheung, 2002), as well as a service and tourism 
intense one (Vogel, 1989). As Cheung (2002, p.128) notes, more than 1.4 million people were 
directly employed by these (foreign invested) firms”. For example, the Taiwanese company, 
Foxconn, which supplies devices to Apple’s iPhone and iPads products, employs as many as 
900,000 employees in Guangdong to run its daily operation (Qiu, 2012).  
In order to attract foreign investments, the provincial capital, Guangzhou, was dedicated 
to improve its tourism and hospitalities sectors since the 1980s. The development of five-stars 
hotels (mostly own and managed by Hong Kong companies at the time) not only created new 
revenue, employments, and brought the concept of customer services and setting new 
standards ‘that began to reverberate throughout the city and the Delta’ (Vogel, 1989, p.203). 
These luxury hotels also represent sites of modernity for the local people, where capitalist 
mode of management, service standards, and product qualities set up striking contrast to the 
everyday experience in Guangzhou at the time. More importantly, the fact that Guangzhou 
later became the first major city in China to ‘allow ordinary people without special permission 
in the front doors of the first-class hotels for foreign guest’ (Vogel, 1989, p.203) further 
facilitated the bodily experience of western modernity for the local Cantonese on the one hand, 
and develop a sense of equalities: there were virtually no physical barriers to experience and 
witness the settings, presentations, facilities, products, qualities and even interactions with 
western modernity (hotels were the easiest place to meet western foreigners) directly.3 These 
hotels not only became sites to imagine a different and better material lives, but they also 
symbolised a better and fairer social concept where social and economic statuses were 
dissolved (although temporarily and imaginatively). 
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Hong Kong 
Besides people’s personal and direct experience with the changing materialist and conceptual 
values during the reforms, the imagination of modernity remained critical. Guangdong’s 
economic development and social changes are closely related to Hong Kong. Although the 
geographical and ethnic proximity to Hong Kong are given, the cultural intimacy is 
constructed and evolved through migration/investment and media and popular cultural 
consumption. The geo-culture in Guangdong are shaped by its close historical, ethnic and 
cultural ties with Hong Kong (Fung and Ma, 2002; Ma, 2012). Many Guangdong people have 
relatives living in Hong Kong (see Ma, 2012). Shenzhen, for example, has been the prime site 
of illegal migrants from Guangdong to Hong Kong throughout the 1970s and 1980s. Many 
Guangdong people set foot to Hong Kong and established new lives. But the family bonds 
never disappear. Besides sending monetary and material goods (toys, electronic and 
furniture’s are the most common products) back to Guangdong, sharing their tales and stories 
of their lives in a capitalist city becomes the counter-narrative to the official socialist 
narrations. This cross border imaginations becomes a major force that shapes the public 
imagination of western modernity in Guangdong even during the Mao’s era. Ambivalences 
arise as identity, choice of goods and products, media consumption and cultural affiliation are 
crossing the borders between two different social, economic and political systems.  
The cross-border imagination was later reinforced during the 1980s and 1990s as Hong 
Kong television and popular culture flourish the media and social spheres in Guangdong. The 
freer news programs and wide variety of contents set up the striking contrast to the television 
programming in the mainland China, which were mainly the structured socialist propagandas 
contents. As a window to global capitalism for Guangdong, the consumption of Hong Kong’s 
mediascape (Ma, 2012) sets the benchmark for social just, political freedom, and cultural 
tolerance in Guangdong’s socioscape. The disjunctive between a lagging-behind socioscape 
in Guangdong and the forward, modernised mediascape from Hong Kong at the time not only 
creates cross-border imaginations (Ma, 2012), but invokes critical reassessments of the 
everyday realities in Guangdong.   
But the consumption of Hong Kong media and popular culture were not given to 
Guangdong that Hong Kong culture did not simply ‘flow’ into Guangdong due to population 
movements and economic cooperation. Instead, the experience of accessing Hong Kong 
media and culture were the results of constant struggles between the people and the provincial 
government, and the Guangdong government with the Central government. According to a 
historical account in XueXi Bolan (Study Exhibition), an academic journal published by 
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China’s Department of Education, Guangdong in fact ‘fought for’ the right to access and 
consume Hong Kong television programs and popular culture back in the 1980s (Mumian 
Huakai, 2011). 4  
The diffusion of Hong Kong media during the 1980s was strongly criticised by some 
high ranking Central leaders who have ordered to ban Hong Kong television (Mumian Huakai, 
2011). However, the Guangdong Government did not take the order and instead, conducted a 
survey and found majority of Hong Kong television programs ‘provide timely and accurate 
news and information; the programs are more attractive to the public because they were 
focusing on ordinary people’s everyday lives’ (2011). Therefore, the Guangdong provincial 
government at the time decided to take an ‘one eye open one eye closed’ (zheng zhi yan, bi 
zhi yan) approach: only ban Hong Kong television when there are high ranking political/Party 
leaders visiting Guangdong. Guangdong people could thus continue to enjoy their Hong Kong 
media.  
This brief historical account has great significance in two ways. The subversive and 
liberal features that defined Guangdong’s local and historical identity (Mumei Huakai, 2011) 
not confirmed with the previous discussion, they also illustrate the evolving process of 
Guangdong’s social resources of political deliberation. Furthermore, the struggles between the 
provincial and the Central governments also illustrate different governing mindsets between 
the two political spheres. Guangdong’s cultural intimacy with Hong Kong and Gaungdong 
people’s desire and imagination of the western modern world at the time, were therefore, 
partly encouraged and endorsed by the provincial government. 
In a comparative study about urban homeowners’ protests over the local government’s 
violation of homeowners’ interest between Beijing and Guangzhou, Wu and Yip (2010) found 
the numbers, frequencies and intensities of homeowners’ protests are always higher in 
Guangzhou than Beijing, and residents in Guangzhou are able to take ‘more diversified’ 
actions, such as call the police, signing petitions, using the media, or appealing to higher level 
of governments, to protect their rights and interests as homeowners. The authors believe it is 
because comparing to people in Beijing, people in Guangzhou ‘have stronger desire to self-
govern their own property’ due to their ‘comprehensive international communication and the 
proximity of Hong Kong’ (p.522).   
The social resources of political deliberation in Guangdong come from diverse range of 
historical, cultural, social and political economic reasons. This brings to the discussion in the 
next section where I will explore the theoretical implications of deliberative democracy in 
Guangdong.  
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Theoretical implications of deliberative democracy in Guangdong 
Much are written on the development of deliberative democracy in China in both English 
(Bell, 2006; He, 2006; Zhou, Chan and Peng, 2008; Fishkin et. al., 2010) and Chinese (Chen 
and Du, 2005; Huo and Yu, 2006; Fu, 2010). The proliferation of scholarly works in both 
languages shows the relevancy of the concept of deliberative democracy in a Chinese context 
on the one hand, and the persisting uncertain outlooks of political reforms on the other. What 
further energise academic debates in the area is the advancement of the Internet, where many 
works conceptualise the cyberspace as an alternative sphere for political deliberation both in 
the West (Dahlberg, 2001; Ondrušek, 2010) and in China (Zhang and Dai, 2010).  
Emerging as an alternative framework to and critic of liberal, electrode democratic 
system, deliberative democracy ‘provides a stronger source of political legitimacy for 
collective decision’ (Stokes, 2006, p.54). Authors generally recognise that the role and 
function of deliberative democracy is not only to hold the government and officials 
accountable (Bell, 2006), but to achieve equal participation during the process of political 
deliberation (Zhou, Chan and Peng, 2008; Fishkin et al. 2010) through minimising ‘the unfair 
advantages of the wealthy capitalist class and to secure the legitimate interests of the poor and 
the marginalized’ (Bell, 2006, p.150). Promoting diversity based on mutual respect (Gutmann 
and Thompson, 2004; Zhang and Dai, 2010) are thus keys to the legitimacy and effectiveness 
of deliberative institutions. But how to embrace diverse voices and different social groups 
presents a major challenge (Karpowitz, Raphael and Hammond, 2009), and it is particularly 
the case in China. There are mainly two challenges: China’s authoritarian political system, 
and as a consequence, the failure of media institutions to be the ‘watchdog’ for public 
interest.5 Despite more than three decades of economic reform, the Chinese government still 
reject political pluralism. Although various local and village elections have been held and trial 
over the years (He and Ethan, 2006; He and Thøgersen, 2010), hardly ever democratic 
practices (in any kind) are escalated to a higher administrative levels (such as prefectural- and 
provincial levels). Political corruptions, bureaucratic power abuse persist due to lack of 
governing transparency and public scrutiny and supervision.   
Although various types of deliberative institutions and platforms, such as deliberative 
polling (Fishkin et al. 2010), Confucian chamber (Bell, 2006) and direct election (at a local 
scale) for people’s representatives (zhixuan renda daibiao) to the People’s Congress (Fu, 
2010), and the more recent Internet-related cyber-consultation and deliberation (Xiao, 2012) 
offer viable and instructive directions for the design and implementation of deliberative 
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politics in China, they nevertheless, face the political realities of a party that is uncomfortable 
and unwilling to overly promote and launch political changes. As Weber (2008, p.64-67) 
rightly states, the government ‘continues to be the guiding force in the developing of civil 
society in contemporary China’. While it is not my purpose to suggest another form of 
deliberative intuitions, one should also regard deliberative democracy as a social analytical 
framework that offers a multi-dimensional interpretation of the everyday political dynamics in 
China.  
In the case of Guangdong, the above overview of Guangdong’s social, cultural and 
economic development meant to identify the local social conditions of political deliberation. 
Guangdong’s historical significances of openness for example, indicate the region is more 
acceptable and ready to embrace western ideologies and values for its own causes. This has 
been further energised by the Chinese government’s economic reform policies during the 
post-Mao era, as engaging and negotiating with western culture and perception were made 
official.  
A core element of deliberative democracy that this essay has yet to mention is ‘public 
consensuses’. This is not to say deliberative democracy is about reaching the ultimate 
common goal of a fixed public agreements and recognition of certain issue, instead, as 
Gutmann and Thompson (2004, p.6) write, deliberative democracy does not ‘presuppose that 
the decision at hand will in fact be justified … it keeps open the possibility of a continuing 
dialogue, one in which citizens can criticise previous decisions and move ahead’. The reason 
of continuous deliberation and negotiation is because ‘reasonable differences will persist’, 
instead of thinking to eliminate moral disagreements among members of the public, learning 
to embrace, understand and respect each others’ differences  offers a more charitable and 
more realistic governing (Gutmann and Thompson, 2004, p.29). Gutmann and Thompson’s 
discussion of moral disagreement and mutual respect provides an important departure point to 
assess Guangdong’s social dynamics.6  
The earlier overview of Guangdong lays down some important social and cultural 
resources for political deliberation, however, they do not warrant political deliberation or 
democratic sentiments will be nurtured and developed. Guangdong is a region full of social 
conflicts and class polarisations. While being the first to reform provides early opportunities 
for economic prosperities and social developments, this test-bed role also expose Guangdong 
to uncertainties and unprecedented social issues due to the drastic and rapid economic reforms. 
Again, I will highlight some general and national controversies and issues of economic reform, 
and then I will discuss how these national transformations affect Guangdong’s local society. 
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Guangdong: home of the richest and poorest places in China 
In March 2010, Guangdong’s Party Secretary Wang Yang states, ‘the richest place in China is 
in Guangdong, and the poorest place in China is also in Guangdong … this is a disgrace of 
Guangdong’ (China Economic Weekly, 2010). There are two major policies changes of the 
economic reform merit attention: lifting up the restriction of population movements between 
rural and urban regions, and privatising state own enterprises (SOEs). Rural collective 
arrangement was dismantled and all collective property with the exception of farmland was 
privatised. Peasants became an individual labourer rather than part of the collective national 
system (Yan, 2010). This has a profound impact on Guangdong’s demographic shifts as 
villagers were free to sell their surplus agriculture produces in the cities, and people with rural 
residency were free to travel to urban capitals to seek employment opportunities. As Cheung 
(2002, p.135) argues, ‘the economic gap that emerged between Guangdong and neighbouring 
provinces was the attraction of migrants from less developed areas’. These migrants, some 
ending up stayed in Guangdong permanently and some only stay there temporarily and move 
on for other opportunities. According Guangdong Government’s official website (2011), in 
the first decade of the new millennium, Guangdong’s population increased by more than 17 
millions, 6.4 million of which are ‘floating population’ (temporary) and 2.08 million are new 
migrants to Guangdong (they change their permanent residency to Guangdong). For example, 
half of Dongguan’s population are migrants. In order to survive, these new migrants are 
willing to accept lower wages than (often half or even less of) the locals (Cheung, 2002). 
 Another major economic reshuffles took place at the same time was the downsizing 
and privatisation of thousands of SOEs: more than 63 million jobs in SOEs were cut between 
1993 and 2002 nation-wide (Yan, 2010, p.498). The end of ‘iron rice bowl’ (tie fan wan) not 
only ended job and income securities, but also lead to the end of secure housing, schooling 
and health care systems, which become the new financial burdens during the post-Mao era, 
and many call them ‘the new three mountains’ (xin san zuo da shan) on the backs of the 
Chinese people (Qiu, 2009). Although the decentralisation and privatisation of SOEs induce 
market competition and individualisation (in terms of economic and social independencies), 
these drastic changes within such a short period of time greatly increased the financial 
burdens and economic ‘shocks’ to urban dwellers. Laid-off middle age workers and 
unemployed youth (including many university graduates) struggle to cope with Guangdong’s 
rapidly increased costs of living.  
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For example, Guangzhou’s standard of living increased by 5.5% from 2010 to 2011. 
Food prices experienced the most severe inflation: the prices of rice (up 11.2%), meat and 
poultry (up 15.7%), fishery (up 14.1%), which constitute the basic everyday living, all went 
up. At the same time, unemployment increased by 6,300 people and the average real income 
only increased by 6.5%, which fall short of the above inflation figures (Guangdong 
Government, 2012).     
The demographic shift and mounting financial pressure with growing competitive 
labour market busted as social tensions. The identity conflicts between local and ‘outsiders’ 
intensify over employment, economic and social resources, cultural recognitions, and even 
families disputes, as migrant workers are often blamed for social unrests and public securities 
(Cheung, 2002). 7 For example, female rural migrants are often portrayed as ‘second wives’ 
who intrude the stabilities of urban families (Zheng, 2009). Many local Cantonese call new 
migrants ‘lao lao’ (in Cantonese means dirty and uncivilised northern people) or ‘New 
Guangzhou people’ (in Guangzhou), to express their cultural and social superiority on the one 
hand, and express dismay and discomforts about the demographic shifts.     
 
From social conflicts to deliberation on the cyberspace 
Instead of thinking deliberative democracy as a form of governmentality as many deliberative 
theorists coin, at here, I see deliberative democracy as a powerful social analytical framework 
of Guangdong. I have deliberately leave the discussion of the Internet till now is because the 
above discussion meant to highlight the localised social resources of deliberative democracy 
in Guangdong. These resources are evolved (in dynamic process) through social economic, 
and cultural technological developments, rather than constructed by any specific means (such 
as communication technologies, economic reforms, or political/cultural institutions). 
Therefore, instead of conceptualising the Internet as an alternative public sphere which 
position in between the official universe and non-official universes, I focus on media practices 
and media culture as Nick Couldry (2012) suggests: what are people doing in relation to the 
media, and eventually, what is the role of media in our society.  
Not only the Internet presents itself as a global network and is increasingly integrated 
into Chinese people’s everyday lives (Yang, 2008), but the Internet constitute an important 
part of Guangdong’s social and economic development. As Cockain (2012, p.19) puts, ‘media 
must be considered in relation to all other social spaces and practices’ in China and I extend 
that the Internet must be closely examined in relation to all political and social discourses in 
Guangdong. As highlighted in the earlier part, Guangdong has the biggest Internet users in 
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China and the highest penetration rate among all provinces. Not only so, despite the 
hyperinflation of most goods and services in recent years, the only goods and service that has 
experienced deflation in Guangzhou was transportation and communication, dropped by 0.6% 
from 2010-2011 (Guangdong Government, 2012). ICT consumptions become more 
affordable across social strata,8 and thus, the online discourse contains diverse interests and 
voices, and the consumption of the Internet becomes a social practice to voice, to learn, and to 
negotiate between different social groups. 
Authors recognise Internet’s technical features such as decentralisation, openness, 
anonymity, and instantaneousness of the flow of news and information (Chen and Du, 2005); 
will lead to diversity, independency, and aggregation of individuals’ personal opinions 
(Ondrušek, 2010). The Internet, thus, has the potential to extend public sphere by including 
the marginalised and neglected social groups (Dahlberg, 2001). In the case of China, such a 
potential is problematic as China lacks the democratic institutions to encourage and train 
citizenry skills: people lack the senses social duties and public responsibilities and this leads 
to extreme views and incapacities to embrace diverse opinions (Chen and Du, 2005, p.46). 
Thus, online expression cannot be considered as political deliberation as Chinese Internet 
users ‘did not incorporate opposing ideas or others’ views in their ongoing quest for 
information and conversation’ (Zhou, Chan and Peng, 2008).  
These criticisms are valid as they are right to reject the simplistic assumption that the 
Internet is able to serve as an extension of or being an alternative public sphere. These 
criticisms, however, presents some shortcomings in understanding cyber politics in China. 
While extreme social sentiments and irrational personal attacks do not contribute to a healthy 
democratic system, too often, studies draw on such a conclusion by neglecting the fact that 
China is yet a democratic state. When the basic assurance of being protected for ‘speaking out’ 
is not even legislated, hardly can one assume deliberation can follow the path of rationalities 
in China. Moreover, by lingering on a ‘sphere approach’, current scholarship over emphasis 
the Internet’s role in facilitating ‘public consensus’ and its potential to ‘resolve’ moral 
disagreements. In fact, ‘media do not reduce or resolve (moral) disagreement: on the contrary, 
they bring it into view’; therefore, media ‘must instead acknowledge moral diversity’ 
(Couldry, 2012, p.182 - 183). As a consequence, current scholarship also do not seek to 
understand how diverse Internet-related practices help to facilitate the deliberative process of 
acknowledging and recognising moral conflicts, and how members of the public learn to 
accommodate each others’ differences.  
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The development of the Internet in China in general, and particularly in Guangdong, 
presents a theoretical bridge between media practices and political deliberations, as cyber 
politics: 1. acknowledges the persistence of moral disagreements between members of the 
society; 2. extends the scope of participation; and thus, 3. facilitates the gradual emergence of 
‘intersubjectivities’.  
As mentioned, Guttmann and Thompson (2004) argue that moral disagreement will 
persist. Instead thinking how a deliberative framework can eliminate and resolve moral 
disagreements between members of the public, learning to respect moral disagreements 
‘forces more careful consideration by challenging points of view – hence, those who 
deliberate form better reasoned opinions’ (Price, Cappella and Nir, 2002). The so-called 
extreme views on the Internet, thus, acknowledge the presence of differences. The Internet 
helps to bring them out to greater public for consideration, disagreement, contestation, and 
communication. As Gutmann and Thompsons (2004, p.89) note, ‘citizens may find it 
necessary to make extreme and uncompromising statements and to refuse to cooperate with 
opponents’, but ‘these strategies may be justified when, for example, they are necessary to 
gain attention for a legitimate position that would otherwise be ignored.’   
The failure of mass media being the ‘watchdog’ for public’s interest indicate the 
absence of a western democratic like channels for marginalised groups to voice their concerns 
in China. ‘Attention grabbing’ through expressing extreme views or using uncompromised 
languages and devoting excessive emotions through the Internet might be their last resources 
and political assets. Just like the anti-Japan protest in mid 2012, some extreme actions, such 
as destroying people’s Japan-manufactured cars in Guangdong, were mostly done by 
disadvantaged social groups, such as laid-off workers, migrant workers, and people who have 
experienced social injustices (Sohu, 2012). The Internet, therefore, helps to voice these moral 
and social differences more frequently and openly to the wider public for considerations and 
deliberations.   
The second concern is the scope of political participation through the Internet. One 
theme becomes difficult to address in Gaungdong is ‘who are Guangdong’s citizens’? The 
biggest and by far the most confronting issue to a place like Guangdong is not merely the 
vertical state-public interactions, that many assume an authoritarian state will be. The more 
profound conflicts might be found between the publics. As there is no such singular public in 
China (Zhao, 2009; Yu, 2009, 2011, Qiu, 2009), instead, to borrow Nancy Frasers’ (1990) 
concept of the conflicts between different counter-publics, political deliberation should also 
concern the confrontations, negotiations and communications between members of the public, 
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who eventual possess moral disagreements, but deliberation helps to develop mutual respects 
(Gutmann and Thompson, 2004; Chen and Du, 2005).  
While ‘people’ is often used as a unit for democratic political participation, convention 
wisdoms in both liberal democratic theory and political communication tend to perceive ‘the 
people’ as homogeneous, thus the term ‘participation’ becomes somewhat simple and straight 
forward. This, however, is not necessary the case in Guangdong, as discussed, the translocal 
culture and high population movements question the concept of ‘citizenship’. As Warren 
(2002, p.174) states, ‘democracy requires not only equality of votes, but also equal and 
effective opportunity to participate in processes of collective judgement.’ Political 
participation in general (Western and non-Western system) tend to favour the idea of 
‘citizenship’, which in itself becomes an exclusion, because citizenship is a status, both 
politically and socially. To some, citizenship is given (local), while to others, it must be 
earned (migrants, outsiders).  
This (western) democratic debate of inclusion and exclusion parallels with the debate of 
rural-urban disparities, and local-outsider politics in Guangdong. The population registry, 
hukou system makes a specific distinction between local and non-local. As mentioned, being 
an outsider in an urban capital such as Guangdong will be disadvantaged in terms of 
employment, education, social welfares and health care entitlements. But not only so, cultural 
and social suppression (such as the stereotypical view of migrant workers are the cause of 
social and public unrests) that works on the identity politics further aggravate the political 
inequalities in terms of participation.  
Therefore, the question of ‘who can be a participant in the deliberative process’ (Stokes, 
2006, p.58) becomes vital. As Guangdong is increasingly identified by translocality and 
hybrid culture that is framed against identity conflicts and unrests due to soaring wealth 
polarisation, high volume of population movement, intensifying cultural collisions, and 
ongoing linguistic contestations. The Internet is thus not simply a ‘participatory’ tool for vast 
majority of the Internet users in Guangdong, but it enables ‘participation’ to overcome the 
categorical barriers between ‘resident’ (temporary or permanent) and ‘citizen’, where 
equalities of participation is achieved not because of the free access, but the blurring and 
ambiguous online identities that make the differentiations between ‘citizen’ and ‘non-citizen’ 
become irrelevant. 
 The irrelevancy of residential/citizenry statuses allows the wider and broader 
deliberation beyond the simple state-public interaction. The Internet facilitates a public-public 
deliberation where the flow of communication and negotiation goes horizontal. Some media 
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scholars terms this horizontal approach as ‘intersubjectivities’: the so-called class struggles in 
China today is not about how one class unseat or eradicate another, but it is about how 
different classes learn to respect and embrace each others’ subjectivity, and in doing so, they 
create a new social collectivism that contain the interests of all parties (Qiu, 2010, p.64). This 
approach resembles Couldry’s investigative concern of how media presences moral diversities; 
andit  bridges with deliberative theories’ arguments of ‘learning to disagree’ based on ‘mutual 
respects’ (Gutmann and Thompson, 2004) and ‘understanding opponents’ positions’ (Dryzek, 
2006). This point is best to be illustrated by a case study. 
 
The death of a little girl  
In October 2011, a little toddler names Wang Yue (Chinese public and media call her, Xiao 
Yueyue), was hit and run by two different motor vehicles in Foshan, Guangdong. Eighteen 
pedestrian walked passed the dying girl but none offered assistance. She was later rescued by 
a garbage collector, but died in a Guangzhou hospital ten days later. This entire scene was 
captured by the street surveillance camera, which was released by news media and quickly 
circulating the Internet. The incident generated as many as 45 million posts on Sina Weibo 
(CNN, 2011), and 39.6 million search results on Baidu, China’s biggest Internet search 
engine.9 Many Internet users and mass media expressed disbeliefs, horrors and angers over 
the two drivers and the eighteen pedestrians. The incident also captured the attention from 
China’s political sphere. Guangdong Government launched an online consultation platform 
on its Sina Weibo account to seek public opinions about legislating laws to punish those who 
refuse to help others in a public space (C.Y. Zheng, 2011).  
Social responsibilities and duties to others were the major theme of public discussion at 
the time. Political deliberation in this case, was not about policy making or governing 
approach, but the process of learning to understand others’ positions and moral disagreements. 
It was understandably that the public debate was highly emotional, as angers against the two 
drivers and eighteen pedestrians dominated the public realm. Terms such as ‘heartless’ and 
‘cold-blooded’ were used to describe the drivers and the pedestrians on mainstream media 
and cyberspace. Foshan Daily used broad and large title, ‘This day, they made Foshan 
ashamed!’ on its front page the day after the incident to condemn the ‘seriously lacking of 
social moralities’.  
Despite the fact that emotions were the main participatory mechanism of social and 
political engagements, the public discussion at the time, were developing structurally into 
different stages: firstly, people expressed concerns and sorrow toward Xiao Yueyue and her 
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family. Secondly, they condemned the two drivers and the eighteen pedestrians who failed to 
rescue the girl. Thirdly, they praised and looked up to Chen Xianmei, the garbage collector 
who has rescued Xiao Yueyue. Fourthly, online users questioned themselves. I conceptualise 
these four stages as the emergence of public-public deliberation in Guangdong and they were 
crystallised by the online practices of ‘voting’ and ‘commenting’.  
By media practices, I mean the bodily and mentally actions and behaviours that are 
conducted routinely with the Internet (in responding to the incident), and constitute social 
interactions with others. By asking ‘what do people do in responding to the Xiao Yueyue 
incident on the Internet’, it helps to identify and assess the development of (possible) political 
deliberations. In order to address this deliberative process, I focus on the online poll launched 
on Foshan Daily’s Sina Weibo10 account. The poll was launched after the incident and closed 
on 23 October 2011. The polling question was ‘what would you do if you were those 
pedestrians?’, and there were four choices and only one option can be chosen: 1. Lift up the 
girl and rescue her; 2. Call 120 (ambulance) or 110 (police) straight away; 3. Pretend didn’t 
see her to avoid troubles; 4. Unclear, it’s too complicated. 142,445 people voted, and 1,451 
threads of discussions were posted in response to the poll. Most people voted for option 2 
(78.6%, 111,997 votes), and number 3 was the least chosen option (1.9%, 2,771 votes).  
I do not focus on the settings and operations of this poll, instead, I focus on the actual 
practices of ‘voting’ and ‘commenting’ as they facilitate the process of ‘understanding 
opponent’s position’, and hence address moral disagreements between members of the public. 
By voting and commenting, two processes took places on the Internet: self-reflection and 
trying to understand the choices (of not saving the girl) made by the eighteen pedestrians. As 
Dryzek (2006, p.28) states, the process of deliberation ‘is more than bargaining because the 
idea is that participants try to understand and recognize the legitimacy of the positions held by 
their opponents’. ‘Opponent’ might be an inaccurate term here, but these pedestrians were 
villanised and condemned. They were effectively the ‘others’ standing directly opposite to the 
moral high ground. However, instead of ‘negotiating’, voting offered an opportunity for 
Internet users to place themselves into the position held by these eighteen ‘heartless and cold 
blooded’ pedestrians in order to understand and recognise their moral decisions at the time. 
Whether or not Weibo users’ choices on Sina Weibo were the true reflection of their true 
consciousness becomes irrelevant as voting facilitates poll participants to ground their view 
point from an opposite stand.  
As Weibo users vote, they also comment. By commenting, Weibo users comment about 
their own moral choices (the practice of voting). Many comments express scepticisms of the 
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fact that nearly 80% of people choose to call the police and medical emergence services, as 
they believed the poll only serves as an ‘imaginative hypothesis’. While others expressed 
dismay and anger about the fact that there are still as many as 2.7% (2,771) people have 
chosen not to help the little girl. Commenting enable the Weibo users to consider a much 
wider range of issues in making their moral choice, as well as learning and considering others’ 
perspectives (not only the eighteen pedestrians, but also other Weibo users who have 
participated into the discussion and voting).  
Many comments pointed to the failure of China’s legal system to protect ‘good 
Samaritans’ activities.11 In relation to this, some others raised the point that most of the 
involved personnel (drivers, pedestrians and victims) are Guangdong’s ‘outsiders’, and their 
subconscious reaction of avoiding unnecessary troubles in an ‘outside’ place is somewhat 
understandable, as they simply want to protect themselves. Some other members also 
questioned Xiao Yueyue’s parents, who, they believe, lacked parenting responsibilities. But at 
the same time, counter arguments also appeared by pointing out the commercial nature of the 
place, a metal exchange market, and the busy business nature these caused parenting 
negligence among shop owners (Xiao Yueyue’s parents run a metal shop there). A notable 
feature here is how the comments were Guangdong centric (given this is a Weibo account of a 
local newspaper), which shows Internet-related practices are not isolated from the immediate 
societal economic preconditions, as these contextual factors constituted as the ‘rational 
reasons’ for deliberating disagreements. The practice of commenting also involves replying 
others’ comments, which became a social dialogue on Foshan Daily’s Weibo page. 
Commenting thus served as the constant reassessments to assure the legitimacy of current 
choices (by voting). 
More importantly, after the practices of voting, many Internet users confessed that they, 
too, confronted with a moral dilemma. This moral dilemma, as many Weibo members have 
pointed out, was caused by a range of issues as discussed, as well as the commercialisation 
nature of the metal market place. The frequent reference to ‘commercial market’ is a 
metaphor to the broader economic hardships and injustices during China’s reform era. The 
process of self-criticism and reflection about materialisation and moralities on an individual 
and local level were scaled up to a broader social and national level of the contemporary 
Chinese society.  
This is not to say the eighteen pedestrians were forgiven. The moral disagreements 
persist as majority of Weibo members insisted these pedestrians could have at least called the 
police or ambulance (as reflected by the polling results). As the voting practice requires its 
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participants’ attempt to ‘understand others’ and learning to disagree and accommodate the 
disagreements in a public debate;  moral disagreements became the focal and departure points 
for public-public deliberations, where learning to understand, assess, and accommodate each 
others’ moral conflicts facilitate broader political participations into public affairs. The 
Internet practices of voting and commenting not only drive public engagements and 
participation, but led to serious and critical ‘rethinking’ of duties and responsibilities, self and 
others in Guangdong (and even China).  
 
Concluding remarks 
The case of Xiao Yueyue demonstrates the formation and development of public-public 
deliberation on China’s Internet. This, however, must also be contextualised (or localised) by 
Guangdong’s social preconditions, as firstly, the poll was launched by a local newspaper, and 
it is thus can assume that a large proportion of the participants come from Guangdong. 
Secondly, the frequent references to Guangdong’s social, economic and cultural specifics 
illustrate the relevancy of the place in understanding others’ moral choices and positions. 
Thirdly, although the Guangdong Government-led deliberative practice – to consult the public 
for possible legislation of ‘good Samaritan’ law - fails to produce any legislating outcomes 
(no relevant law was introduced and no further public consultations took place in Guangdong 
by the time of writing, one year after the incident), it nevertheless provides the official and 
symbolic ‘legitimacy’ that permitted (and even encouraged) public debates over a wide range 
of social issues. All of which, resemble to the earlier discussions about Guangdong’s social 
resources of political deliberation.  
A common theme that have emerged from Guangdong’s historical confrontations with 
the West, economic developments, the new ICTs advancement, and popular cultural 
consumption, is the presence of ‘others’ in shaping and constituting the local politics and 
culture. By revising the social economic developments in Guangdong, this essay has explored 
the social resources and preconditions of political deliberation in the province. These 
resources of political deliberation, namely the mechanism of citizenry participations and 
deliberative communications, are not constructed by any specific social, political, or cultural 
institutions, rather, they evolve through the interplays between communication agents, 
technologies, socioeconomic realities, and historical encounters in Guangdong.  
Furthermore, the social and economic development in Guangdong is not an entirely 
smooth and untroublesome one, but rather contradictory and conflictual. While being the first 
to reform brings economic prosperities, modern material and cultural consumption, and 
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experiencing western democratic values and practices to Guangdong, it also brings class 
alienations and social suppressions to the region. It is precisely on these social paradoxes and 
contradictories, the senses of ‘self’ and ‘other’ become significant. As Silverstone puts (2007, 
p.101 - 102), ‘our relation to the other, to the stranger, is the principal determinant of our 
moral worth and our status as human beings’, because ‘the other is no longer just beyond but 
is alongside and within us’. The processes of learning to disagree, to understand and to 
accommodate moral conflicts between ‘self’ and ‘others’ become the main mechanism to 
address the debate of ‘right and entitlement’ and ‘duty and responsibility’ in Guangdong. 
 
Notes                              
 
1 The concept of a Guangdong model is an academic concept suggested by Xiao Bin (2012), professor of public 
administration at Sun Yat-sen University in Guangzhou. The model emphasises on power decentralisation from 
the provincial government. Xiao argues for downsizing government bodies, reducing administrative processes 
and hierarchies, and set up mechanism platform to realise direct dialogue between the government and people, 
thus to encourage citizenary participation during the process of decision making (gongmin canyu gonggong 
juece) and monitoring (jiandu, wenze).  
2 Sun Zhigang, a 27-years-old rural graduate who was wrongly detained by Guangzhou police (under China’s 
detention regime against rural migrants) as he failed to present his temporary residency card. 
3 China Hotel (Zhongguo Da Jiudian), for example, rented out its space to Guangzhou’s Friendship Supermarket 
(Youyi Shangdian), which had the exclusive right to sell import food and daily products. China Hotel’s bakery 
also open to the public during the 1980s, and selling breads, cheese, wines, and pasta, salami, and other western 
food.  
Another feature of five-stars hotels were the toilets in the lobby areas, which were free and open to the public. 
Not only the level of hygiene, cleanness, and luxury setting (classical music in the background and high qualities 
of toilet papers) were highly indulgence to ordinary local people, but most toilets in five stars hotel had (still 
have) a toilet attendant, who will hand over hot towels, tissues, and turn on/off the water taps of the basin for 
their customers; these were the services and standards that could not be imagined in Guangdong’s (even China) 
everyday lives.  
4 The use of ‘literature nickname’ (bi ming) is a common practice in Chinese literature throughout the history. 
5 Conversely, media scholar Yuezhi Zhao (2004, p.43) describes Chinese media as ‘the lapdogs that kiss to 
please, the watchdogs that attack and protect’ of a ‘ruthless Party master’.  
6 Also see Price, Cappella and Nir’s (2010) empirical study on how moral disagreement contribute to 
deliberative opinion 
7 See Cheung (2002, p.137-138) for a detail discussion about the declining public orders and growing criminal 
activities in Guangdong during the 1990s. While the demographic shifts and economic hardship do play a role in 
the proliferation of Guangdong’s criminal activities, Cheung (p.137) also notes, crimes such as smuggling also 
involved ‘cadres and public-security personnel at basic levels’. Thus official corruption and power abuse become 
the most resilience factor of the persistency of these crimes. 
8 See Jack Linchuan Qiu (2009) for a comprehensive investigation of China’s ‘information have-less’, as migrant 
workers, laid-off workers, elderly, and unemployed youth constitute a large part of China’s network society. 
Their economic needs facilitate low-end ICT productions and consumption. Qiu’s work is particularly relevant to 
Guangdong as much of his fieldworks in the book were conducted in Guangdong (with migrant workers in 
particular).  
9 By searching the Chinese character, Xiao Yueyue Shijian (Little Yueyue Incident), search done on 17 October 
2012. 
(http://www.baidu.com/s?wd=%E5%B0%8F%E6%82%A6%E6%82%A6%E4%BA%8B%E4%BB%B6&pn=0
&ie=utf-8&usm=3).  
10 Weibo, with capital letter ‘W’ is used to specifically refer to Sina Weibo; where ‘weibo’ refers to 
microblogging service in China in general.  
11 Many people were refereeing to the Peng Yu case in 2006. Peng Yu, a young man, helped and brought an old 
lady who fell to the ground and broke her leg to hospital in Nanjing; instead of thanking Peng Yu, the old lady’s 
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family took Peng to court, which ruled Peng guilty for causing physical injuries to the old lady, and Peng was 
penalised by paying 40% of the medical cost. The case angered and frighten many Chinese, who distrust China’s 
legal system to protect ‘good Samaritans’. Many online comments refers to the Peng Yu case has ‘demoralised’ 
China’s society.  
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